Bill Matthews כתב ביום שישי מאמר על עתידם של המפציצים האסטרטגים תחת הסכם START החדש. המאמר מציג השפעה אפשרית של צורת ספירת ראשי הנפץ הגרעיניים ע"פ ההסכם החדש על כמות המפציצים האסטרטגים של ארה"ב.
האמת היא שגם אם ביל צודק והזרוע האווירית של ה- Triad האמריקאי תחלש, לא נראה כי הדבר יחליש את היכולת הגרעינית של ארה"ב משום שהשימוש במפציצים אסטרטגים היא רק תוכנית חלופה לכל שאר אפשרויות השילוח.
אז מה בעצם כל העניין של הספירה אומר?
תחת ההסכם החדש כל מפציץ ייחשב ככלי נשק גרעיני אחד בעוד שלמעשה יש להם פוטנציאל נשיאה של 16-20 ראשי נפץ. המשמעות של כל זה היא, שההצהרה של הבית הלבן בדבר הפחתת מספר ראשי הנפץ המותרים לאחזקה ב- 60% מהסכם START הראשון וכ – 30% מההסכם שחתם בוש במוסקבה אינה נכונה.
Via - FAS.org
ע"פ החבר'ה מ FAS, אם נעשה שימוש בשיטת הספירה המוצעת בהסכם נגלה שארה"ב מחזיקה בכ-1650 ראשי נפץ (במקום 2100) ואילו ברית המועצות מחזיקה בכ-1740 (במקום 2600). הם גם עשו את החשבון וגילו שמדובר בערך ב 1310 ראשי נפץ גרעיניים אשר נעלמו מהספירה. היעד של 1550 ראשי נפץ כבר לא נראה רחוק, במיוחד כאשר מדברים על טווח של 10 שנים פלוס יכולת להארכה (חד פעמית) של 5 שנים.
באופן מפתיע איראן והמעצמות הצליחו להגיע לפריצת דרך משמעותית ומבורכת בנוגע לתוכנית הגרעין של איראן. איראן הסכימה לשלוח כמות מסויימת של אורניום מועשר (ככל הנראה כמות שתסיר את החשש שיהיה באיראן מספיק אורניום מועשר לצרכי פיתוח נשק) למדינות אחרות לשם עיבוד מחדש. בנוסף איראן הסכימה לאפשר לפקחים של הסוכנות הבינלאומית לאנרגיה אטומית לבקר במתקן שאובמה חשף בשבוע שעבר.
ההצהרה כפי שיצאה מדובר מזכירות המדינה האמריקאית בג'נבה
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
October 1, 2009
Geneva, Switzerland
Senior U.S. Official on P5+1 Talks in Geneva
SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Let me start off by recapping the events of the day; and offer a few main impressions; and then open up to your questions.
We spent a total of about 7.5 hours today in a variety of meetings with the Iranians. We started the morning plenary session a little after 10:00 o’clock. That went on for about three hours. Dr. Solana kicked off the meeting as the leader of the 5+1 delegation; the U.S. spoke after Solana; and was then followed by Dr. Jalili, the head of the Iranian delegation and the other members of the 5+1 group, the other political directors.
We then broke for an informal lunch. During this break we had the opportunity to have about a 45 minute one-on-one sidebar discussion with Jalili. It was in a small sitting room next to the main conference room in which we were meeting. Over the next several hours after this lunch break began there were a series of discussions. It was a pretty free-flowing event, both amongst the 5+1 members and with the Iranians.
We held a second short afternoon plenary session, then ended today’s discussions at about 5:30. Solana and Jalili held press conferences which all of you have heard.
Let me touch on a few of the main issues and themes today, at least from our perspective. Solana’s remarks at the press conference captured many of the elements of today’s dialogue. I’d say that four themes emerged: the unity of the 5+1 group, focus on the nuclear issue, the urgency of this intensive or what we hope will be an intensive diplomatic process, and the need for Iran to take practical steps.
During the plenary sessions we had a lengthy conversation about the nuclear issue. We reemphasized our position that Iran has rights, but with those rights come responsibilities. We laid out our view that we look to Iran to take concrete steps to address the international community’s concerns by beginning to create confidence in Iran’s nuclear intentions and establish transparency in its program. We stressed our serious concern about the revelation of the clandestine enrichment plant near Qom and underscored the importance of full cooperation with the IAEA and having an IAEA inspection, as Solana said publicly, within the next couple of weeks. I understand that Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA is going to be in Tehran this weekend to try to iron out the details.
During the plenary and on the margins and during our sidebar discussion, which I can come back to in a minute, we discussed the question of the Tehran research reactor. And maybe a little background would be helpful. This is a research reactor which has been in operation in Tehran for decades, producing medical isotopes under strict IAEA safeguards. The last supply of fuel for this reactor, which is at roughly 19.75 percent LEU, was supplied by the Argentine government in the early 1990s and it’s going to run out in roughly the next year, year and a half.
Iran came to the IAEA a few months ago with the request to replace this supply. The IAEA consulted us and some others, some other members, and to make a long story short the United States and Russia joined together in a proposal to the IAEA which the IAEA subsequently conveyed as a response to the Iranians, to use Iran’s own LEU stockpile as the basis, as the feedstock for the reactor fuel that’s required.
This would then entail taking its LEU, which is enriched to about 3.5 percent, enriching it up to 19.75 percent in Russia, which the Russians have now publicly confirmed that they’re prepared to do, and then fabricating that into fuel assemblies which can be used at this safeguarded reactor, and the French have now confirmed their willingness to play that last role. Those are the basic details involved in the proposal. The potential advantage of this, if it’s implemented, is that it would significantly reduce Iran’s LEU stockpile which itself is a source of anxiety in the Middle East and elsewhere.
During our talks today the Iranians agreed to accept this proposal in principle, and there’s to be a meeting in Vienna on the 18th of October, led by IAEA experts, to try to work out the details.
So again, at least in our view, the research reactor proposal made by the IAEA would be a positive interim step to help build confidence so that we’d have more diplomatic space to pursue Iran’s compliance with its obligations under the Security Council Resolutions, the NPT and the IAEA, and to tackle the more fundamental question of Iran’s nuclear program.
I’m sorry to be so long-winded, but I’ll add a couple of comments on the sidebar conversation with the Iranians.
This was a direct and candid discussion. We reinforced the points that we had made in the plenary session, that all of us have made on our concerns about the nuclear program, stressed again the need for the Iranians to take concrete and practical steps consistent with its international obligations to build confidence, and to demonstrate that its program is exclusively peaceful in nature. While the focus of this bilateral conversation was on the nuclear program, there was also a frank exchange on some other issues, including human rights.
So broadly speaking, I think the significance of today was that Iran, having refused to talk about its nuclear program since July of 2008, engaged on that program today with the United States as a full participant. We began a discussion. I don’t think anyone expected, I said this to some of you yesterday, that no one expected that one day would allow us to resolve international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, but I think today was a first step in what is bound to be a difficult process.
We are in what we hope is an intensive diplomatic phase now. It will not be open ended. We will actively pursue the implementation of the practical steps that Solana has laid out. Why don’t I stop there.
Office of the Press Secretary
____________________________________________________________________________
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 8, 2009
JOINT UNDERSTANDING
The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation have decided on further reductions and limitations of their nations’ strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty, and directed that the new treaty contain, inter alia, the following elements:
1. A provision to the effect that each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the limits will be in the range of 500-1100
for strategic delivery vehicles, and in the range of 1500-1675 for their associated warheads.
The specific numbers to be recorded in the treaty for these limits will be agreed through further negotiations.
2. Provisions for calculating these limits.
3. Provisions on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made
less costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.
4. A provision to the effect that each Party will determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.
5. A provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.
6. A provision on the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic stability.
7. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms exclusively on the national territory of each Party.
8. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve questions related to treaty implementation.
9. A provision to the effect that the treaty will not apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third state.
10. A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.
The Presidents direct their negotiators to finish their work on the treaty at an early date so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries.
Signed at Moscow, this sixth day of July, 2009, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages.
FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE RUSSIAN
OF AMERICA: FEDERATION:
Thomas Graham מספר על 
